appalled and deplored Freemasonry simply because -- Not because they disliked Freemasonry in particular, but because they objected to any form of secret society. They considered such a form extremely dangerous to society. [chuckles] So that I was not a Freemason. But I think that I understood why certain Iranians wanted to unite themselves in this particular way. Q: Why would they want to do that? Avery: Well, I've said why they would want to do it. Because they were living in a socially and politically insecure society. Q: That's right. For security purposes, you mean. Avery: Of course. For purposes of feeling free to be frank and united in some kind of a small coterie of brothers and friends. Q: And mutual support -- some kind of political support.

Avery: And mutual support -- very important element -- the mutual support. Yes. Q: But you don't think that they were that powerful in Iran? Or were they in any way? Avery: The individuals components of a Freemasonry society in Iran were men to whom influence and power would be ascribed -- people like Manuchehr Eqbal who was one such and the Entezams and other such, Hosein 'Ala' and so on. They were all sort of people to whom influence and power were [chuckles] ascribed. But I don't think that this was due to their being in a Freemasonry society. It was due entirely to their individual character and position in society. Freemasonry as such, I think, was totally powerless -- no importance whatsoever -- and a charade. O: It was a charade -- wasn't it? It wasn't connected with the British Freemasonry? Avery: No, I'm afraid it was not. It always wished it were, but it was not.

Q: I wonder why -- on what account the British Freemasonry sort of rejected them? Avery: I think Freemasonries of its nature are pretty insular, if not provincial. It's a very much local town phenomenon, rather like the Lions or the Rotarians. The international aspect of [chuckles] Freemasonry is (I think) very [chuckles] underdeveloped. And also, of course, European Freemasonry is pretty careful about its affiliations. In other words, I think British Freemasonry would rush to be affiliated with --O: Persians. Avery: Persians. Q: Can you remember any other personalities, events, stories that seemed significant to you at the time or reflected on the society and on events? Avery: One of the things that's always astonished me is how slow the West was to realize that there was going to be a revolution in Iran and that that revolution was going to be total. I do wonder [chuckles] why it is that Iranians and other should think, for example, that

Western intelligence services are so [chuckles] good when, obviously, they had no idea of what was happening.

Q: Did you not have any connection with the Embassy people?

Avery: No, none at all -- never.

I have social connections with Embassy people as you well know, since you and I share friends who, at various times, have been in the British Embassy. But I have no official connection whatsoever. In fact, the Embassy's generally suspected me rather than using me. They generally suspected me of being anti-British

and rather too pro the society in which I was living. I was always rather inclined to be a little bit of a maverick sofaras the establishment of my own country was concerned -- and still am and hope to remain so.

So that I always deeply resent Iranian and American suspicions of my being a spy on behalf of governments. I deeply resent it because it's totally untrue and rather ironical if one's suspected by one's own government of being too far the other way. It's rather ironical that the other side should suspect one of being too far towards the way of espionage and so on.

Anyway, it's nothing very important. I just deeply resent it.

Q: No. What I'm saying -- Yes, sure.

Avery: But the one anecdote that I will conclude with is castigatory itself. It's at expense of myself.

When I was in Iran in September, 1975, Asadollah 'Alam was Minister of Court. He asked me to write a book on the Shah and People's Revolution. That is what it was to be called.

And I said, "I couldn't write such a book." Because I would have to say things about the regime which the regime would not like.

When Asadollah 'Alam said, "As if you were writing to me and just be yourself and perfectly honestly," I said, "Well, I'll do that in any case."

"Well," he said, "just write it. The way you will write it won't be offensive. You will write the truth, but you will write it in a gentlemanly and inoffensive way that even he will accept."

And I went back to the old gentleman in whose house I was staying, Seyyed Sadeq Goharin.

And I said, "They want me to write a book."

And to my surprise, expecting my old mentor, my old teacher and brother and friend and father figure to say, "Oh, you wouldn't do anything like that. Leave it, "velesh kon aqa, kar

shoma nist," he didn't say any of those things that I expected him to say.

He said, "How much did they offer you?"

Well, I said, "As a matter of fact, they offered me in great secrecy quite a lot."

And as I'm a very poor man, they presumably were playing on their knowledge of my impecuniosity.

He said, "How much?"

I said, "They offered me six thousand pounds."

He said, "Not enough. The American, the French and other British journalists -"mostashreqin" and all the rest of them -- They've all had their cut. They've all taken their share
out of the loot that this "dowlat" (this regime) is distributing. It is now your turn. Because you,
more than any of them, "tu zehn ma rafte'id. Shoma bish az hamashun mara

mifahmid va mishenasid, nowbat shoma ast; shoma chizetan ra

begirid jan man. Dah hezar Lireh behesh begu'id ke sahm shoma

bashad": your share must be at least ten thousand."

I was amazed at this. It was totally contrary to what I expected him to say.

And I said, "And about the book -- I can't write the book, though."

"Oh," he said, "never mind about the book, "ta moqe'i ke shoma an ketab ra benevisid hich kodam az inha (se daf'eh goft)

nakhahand bud"--by the time you've written this book, not one

these people will be here."

And I took no notice. I saw the British Ambassador that same afternoon. I never mentioned it to him. I wrote to him when the revolution occurred and I said, "I owe you an apology." His name

was Sir Anthony Parsons. I said, "Dear Tony, I owe you an apology." And I told him the whole story and I said, "I saw you the same day and I never told you that a wise, old Iranian had told me that in, say, two [or] three years time not a single one of the people in power at that time would exist." And I

said ---

Q: Why didn't you?

Avery: Because it never occurred to me that it was of any importance or any significance. I thought it was the remark of a silly, frustrated, old man.

But I said, "I apologize now because I was being warned of what was to happen and I took no notice of it. I should have told you, though, perhaps. I should have repeated, at least, the warning."

And he wrote back to me and he said, "Don't worry, Peter. Kind of you to write. But I would have been just the same as you. I would have taken no notice, either. Both of us, then, would have been warned and neither of us would have taken any notice. As it happens, only you received that warning and you took no notice."

I took no notice of what my old friend said. And when the revolution occurred, my old friend wrote to me. And in his letter he said, "I well remember one morning when you returned from your visit to the Minister of Court, sitting in my

"golkhaneh" with me. And I said to you, 'By the time you write that book,' which you never did write, 'not one of them would be there.' And you looked at me "mesl sakhif (should be sahif) pish

'aqil"-- you looked at me like an intelligent man in front of a fool."

And I wrote back and I said, "I remember the morning perfectly well. Your account is only inaccurate in one respect.

I didn't look at you like an intelligent man looking at a fool, but I didn't take in emergence of what you said."

I was warned in that way and in other ways, too, which I won't get into.

But that's the last anecdote. You asked for an anecdote. That's my anecdote.

I was warned in several ways in 1975 [and] again, in 1977, of the onset of the revolution of 1979. And I did not take any notice of the signs which friends of mine spread before me.

Q: Did they know it was the mollahs that were going to do it?

Avery: I don't know what they knew. But they were trying to tell me that somebody was going to do something: "hich kodam az

anha nakhahand bud, tamoqe'i ke shoma benevisid." A lot of people must have known of the amount of money that was taken out of the country by people who will swear that they didn't know.

O: Yes.

Avery: Oh, no. I think there's quite a lot of good to be said for the Pahlavi era and I hope posterity will be kind to it. But posterity may not be. Oh, there is good to be said for the Pahlavi era and it should be said. But there's also a lot of bad to be said of it, I'm afraid -- a great deal of bad.

Q: Yes. But you know, it's like the French left wingers. They used to say, when you used to tell them, "What about Stalin? What of gulag? What about things?"

And they would say, "Well, you know, Le bilan est positive."

I never believed that, of course. Because it isn't. And the bilan of the Soviet regime is not positive. It's almost a hundred percent negative. But I feel that maybe the bilan of the Pahlavis is in some way positive, if only because they liberated half of the human resources there. I mean, all the woman doctors, all the woman nurses, all the woman advocates, teachers -- I mean, all the things that they did. I mean, if you take only that one measure, it seems to me that redeems a lot -- maybe because I'm a woman I think that.

What do you think would the bilan be -- positive or negative -- the whole thing?

Avery: Remind me of what the word "bilan" means.

Q: Sum total.

Avery: Sum total -- that's what I thought it meant.

The history of periods of human activity, I don't (myself) think in terms of bilan. I think in terms of cruelty, oppression, arrogance, greed, corruption -- those terms. I think the bilan of the Pahlavi regime will be extremely negative -- certainly it's aftermath.

O: After --

Avery: It's aftermath is appalling.

No, I don't see much good in history. But I'm a generation that has lived through the massacre of six million Jews. I've lived through episodes worse than anything Genghis Khan has had attributed to him.

So if we're talking about the bilans of history, I can see -- covering the last fifty or sixty years -- no very positive bilan.

Q: Anywhere, you mean.

Avery: Anywhere.

O: Yes.

Any other personalities you would like to mention?

Avery: The courtesy of Engineer Hedayat, Khosrow Hedayat, the dutiful Mallahs, the courtesy of so many Iranian gentlemen whose names are now vilified, I have known -- the old aristocrats. The courtesy of Sadeq Hedayat who was always an aristocrat -- He was always a gentleman.

I remember one night I was too drunk in his company to be allowed to go back to where I was staying. I had to be put up for the night by an Iranian friend, a member of the circle -- a man called Hasan Pakravan (not the same Pakravan I eluded to earlier on -- another Pakravan).

I remember I was drunk, lying on the ground. But I was not so drunk that I didn't hear Hedayat giving minute instructions as to how the bed should be made "in the European style for him, because he's European, you know." And how "he should be given two boiled eggs and toast and preserves for breakfast, because that's the sort of breakfast they have in England, you know." And going on in such meticulous detail -- this perfect gentleman who was always far more concerned with the welfare and the comfort of other people than for himself, and concerned for the other people's welfare and comfort with the imagination of an artist who wanted the foreigner and the Englishman to wake up the next morning in the bed of the type he was accustomed to, to the breakfast of the kind he was used to.

That was Iranian courtesy. But it was the courtesy of an old Persian Iranian gentleman of one of the best families -- the Hedayats.

Q: Voila. Thank you very much.

I think we've reached the end of this particular tape, which is number five. Voila.					
Time we ve reached the old of this particular tape, which is hamber live. Vola.					
[end of interview #1]					

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